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Abstract Knowledge about the cost-effectiveness of
innovative technologies or new guidelines in health care is
more and more a necessary condition for implementation in
common practice. However, there are situations where
implementation of a new technology that is found more
effective and cost effective and is strongly advocated by
the medical profession stagnates. The reason for this is the
discrepancy between long-run efficiency, on which cost
effectiveness is based, and short-run efficiency. This paper
addresses the potential paradox between long-run and
short-run efficiency in health care and explores possibilities
to overcome hurdles to implementation due to that
paradox.
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Introduction
In the Netherlands, as in other European countries and the
US, there is consensus that evidence surrounding new
technologies nowadays should include cost-effectiveness
information. Technology is generally broadly conceived,
covering specific medical technologies, integrated care
modalities, clinical practice guidelines, etc. If the evi-
dence of new technologies is convincing, implementation
might follow. Implementation strategies in general target
increasing speed and level of adoption of new technolo-
gies. Usually these strategies are directed to the medical
profession (education, training, etc.). However, despite
convincing cost-effectiveness evidence and a high
willingness to implement by the medical profession,
implementation might result in unanticipated losses or
diseconomies in the short run, which could be impor-
tant barriers to implement a technology for certain
stakeholders.
Aletras [1] concludes from his empirical work on esti-
mating long-run and short-run cost functions in a sample of
Greek NHS general hospitals that the use of long-run cost
functions should be avoided since it might seriously mis-
lead policymakers. Consequently, according to Aletras,
evidence on economies should presumably place lower
validity weight on estimates derived from long-run as
opposed to short-run cost functions.
Not only the time frame is important with regard to
short- and long-run cost functions, but also the scale at
which health care programs operate. In the long run it is
very well possible that a technology shows constant returns
to scale; however, the same technology will exhibit
decreasing returns to scale in the short run. Elbasha and
Messonnier [2] argue that technologies that are adminis-
tered in health care settings often violate the assumption of
constant returns to scale (costs increase linear with
increasing production) that underlies cost-effectiveness
analysis (CEA). These authors refer to various publications
that illustrate the violation of the constant returns to scale
assumption. For example, studies about nursing homes
have revealed a mixture of findings, ranging from econo-
mies to diseconomies of scale [3–6]. In fact, violation of
the constant returns to scale assumption seems extremely
prevalent in health care. The constant returns to scale
assumption is only appropriate when all health care
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programs or technologies are operating at an optimal scale.
Imperfect competition, budgetary constraints, technology
shifts, contracts, etc., may cause a health care program to
be not operating at optimal scale [7, 8]. However, Kass [6]
presents empirical findings that show that economies of
scale were not substantial in home health care. In this
setting, according to Kass [6], the ratio fixed to total costs
was 5.6%, as labor (about 95%) could be considered var-
iable costs and therefore moved linearly with output. On
the other hand, Roberts et al. [8] found that about 84% of
hospital costs were fixed. Another study about a new
combined outpatient and home treatment of psoriasis
technology showed that 89% of the anticipated savings,
based on the outcomes of an earlier CEA, could not be
achieved in the short run when implementing this tech-
nology due to fixed factors of production (labor and
infrastructure) [7, 9].
In general, stakeholders such as the government and the
medical profession, who are aware of the technology’s
long-run superiority, are often very disappointed if imple-
mentation stagnates, especially if the favorable cost-
effectiveness ratio is due to improved effects rather than to
reduced costs.
Cost-effectiveness analyses (CEAs) do not provide all
economic information necessary for decision making about
the implementation of a new technology. There seems to be
a discrepancy in the information considered sufficient for
decision making about the implementation of a new cost-
effective technology between government, on the one
hand, and for health care management on the other.
Cost-effectiveness analysis neglects short-run efficiency
The evaluation of costs and benefits of new technologies
and implementation of technologies is generally discussed
in the context of welfare economics where welfare losses
on the short run are considered ‘sunk’ [10–12]. This might
be true for governments given they decide on a long
enough planning horizon. In this context, technologies
implemented by health care providers are assumed to be
infinitely divisible, and production factors are supposed to
be homogeneous and consequently perfectly substitutable.
However, this is usually not the case in the short run. For
example, implementation of an automated expert system
making a certain number of personnel obsolete is not able
to collect these savings on the short run because of the
fixed production factor labor (depending on the inflexibility
of the underlying labor contracts), nor can a diagnostic
device such as a magnetic resonance imaging device (MRI)
be infinitely increased proportionately to produce effi-
ciently at a higher scale. CEAs in general assume away the
fixed factor problems.
This long-run/short-run efficiency paradox is exten-
sively dealt with in economic theory and investment
practice (see for example [12, 13]). In economic literature,
it is recognized that interests of different stakeholders
might conflict, which may lead to investment decisions that
do not maximize shareholder wealth [14]. The problem lies
in the way many firms measure performance and reward
managers. However, there is a striking difference between
the economic theory about the firm and the health care
organization. The firm adheres to the firm perspective,
which is maximizing shareholders wealth by following the
net present value rule (choosing those projects with the
highest net present value). CEAs in health care usually
follow a societal perspective maximizing societal health
using the incremental cost per quality-adjusted life year
rule.
The societal perspective and the perspective of health
care management, which is often accountable for short-run
results such as, for example, a balanced yearly budget or is
restricted by financial frameworks like, for example, a
fixed depreciation period, might well be in conflict. In
health care systems where budgetary excesses are sanc-
tioned by a discount in the budget for the following year,
achieving the budget becomes so important that those who
perceive great pressure to meet the budget may be less
inclined to partake of any activity that may increase the
uncertainty in their environment, i.e., investing in a new
cost-effective technology. For the management of health
care organizations, investing in a new cost-effective tech-
nology means that this new technology will probably co-
exist with the inefficient alternative(s) for a considerable
time period. Co-existence of alternative technologies leads
to increasing inefficiency for the organization as well as for
society. The reasoning behind co-existence of alternative
technologies is the use of opportunity costs as a measure of
costs. For fixed factors of production (in the short run),
there is no alternative use. Hence the short-run opportunity
cost of using these fixed factors for production is zero. This
assumption is only an approximation of what really hap-
pens in common medical practice. In many situations, the
opportunity cost is not zero, but the lack of alternatives in
the short run still means that the opportunity cost is lower
in the near term than in the long term. This makes it in the
short run less attractive to substitute the new technology for
the old one. Obviously production factors are not homo-
geneous, and scarcity cannot smoothly be compensated
with excess capacity elsewhere.
The short run can be considered a time period where at
least one production factor is fixed. For infrastructure and
capital such as building space or diagnostic devices such as
CT (computer tomography) or MRI, the short run might be
quite long as financing is determined by a fixed deprecia-
tion period of 10–40 years. In general, CEAs assume away
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the fixed-factor problems and therefore look overly
optimistic in the sense that inefficiencies caused by co-
existence of alternative technologies in the same organi-
zation are neglected.
Diseconomies of scale and scope
A focus on the short run necessitates the inclusion of
information about diseconomies of scale and scope. Dis-
economies of scale refer to the relationship of average costs
with volume of production. For example, one can consider
scale economies to the degree that costs change in relation
to changes in number of hospital beds or changes in
number of diagnostic performances by MRI. Diseconomies
of scale arise when marginal costs of production rise, with
increasing volume of production, higher than average cost.
This may be the result of a variety of factors: returns to
scale, behavior of overheads, indivisibility of factors of
production, nature of contracts between different stake-
holders and the way of organizational governance.
Diseconomies of scope refer to the multipurpose use of
capital investments. Diseconomies of scope are conceptu-
ally similar to diseconomies of scale. Where diseconomies
of scale refer to changes in the output of a single tech-
nology, diseconomies of scope refer to changes in the
number of different types of technologies. For example,
transferring the diagnostics surrounding a certain illness
from CT to MRI decreases the multi-purpose use of CT.
Capacity of the CT modality is freed, and the MRI
modality needs more capacity. In a worse-case scenario, a
transition from CT to MRI might cause diseconomies of
scope with regard to CT and diseconomies of scale in MRI
due to the fact that both CT and MRI production is carried
out at levels that are not at the designed optimum capacity
with the consequence that unit costs will be higher for both
technologies. For a mathematical representation of econo-
mies of scale and scope, Kass [6] is referred to. Such
diseconomies are not just related to ‘high tech’ technolo-
gies such as expert systems, CT, MRI or PET (positron
emission tomography) scan. In general, a CEA considers
the production processes of the competing technologies
isolated from the organization in which these technologies
are embedded. Such diseconomies might also occur in
integrated care technologies or clinical practice guidelines
such as, for example, structured diabetes care. Such pro-
cesses, which can be regarded as supply chains, are
particularly vulnerable to process indivisibilities as stages
in the production process are dependent on each other [15].
In general, the short-run economic obstacles surround-
ing implementation of cost-effective new technologies
might become more important if the rate ‘fixed costs to
total factor costs’ becomes larger.
Diseconomies of learning
Although the focus of this paper is pre-dominantly on the
cost or input site of the production process, the outcome of
a new technology’s production process might suffer as well
in the short run. This might be due to diseconomies of
learning. Diseconomies of learning are about the relation-
ship of volume of health care production and quality of
health care. During the implementation phase, old and new
technology may co-exist. However, most practitioners are
less familiar with the new technology than with the old.
Economies of learning refer to decreasing average cost, or
increasing average effectiveness, as a result of accumu-
lating experience and know-how. Transition from old to
new technologies may well cause the opposite effect:
increasing average costs, or decreasing average effective-
ness, as experience is lacking. It is found that morbidity
and mortality is lower in hospital departments, which
perform more of a given procedure. This result has been
found for a wide variety of different procedures, time
periods, and locations [16]. Shifting from technology might
well cause an increase in morbidity and mortality rates or
more general cause medical quality of care to drop
temporarily.
Challenges for economic evaluation of new technologies
and clinical practice guidelines
Partly responsible for stagnation of implementation of
efficient technologies and the co-existence of alternative
efficient and inefficient technologies in health care is the
lack of focus on short-run efficiency and the health care
perspective. It is important to link knowledge about cost-
effectiveness to potential short-run economic obstacles.
This can be done in its simplest form by, for example,
presenting a rate ‘fixed costs to total factor costs’ of a new
technology and the already existing alternatives together
with the cost-effectiveness information. Doing so might
speed up adoption of a cost-effective technology as it
provides insight into potential hurdles or barriers to
implementation that might be (partially) overcome by
specific strategies. One can think of, for example, imple-
mentation strategies dealing with operational/financial
characteristics (for example, adapt capacity planning or
accounting for time till re-investment) or strategies that
actively search for alternative use of fixed production
factors of inefficient technologies and thereby increase the
opportunity costs of these ‘freed’ production factors.
Consequently, CEAs should be complemented by analyses
that deal with the cost of shifting or retiring fixed factors of
production. Including such strategies in the implementation
of new technologies might minimize the co-existence of
Economic evaluation of innovative technologies in health care 383
123
competing technologies and ultimately result in a more
efficient health care.
A step further would be if the aim of economic evalu-
ation of innovations in health care adds to the CEA-based
research question another research question, namely:
‘‘what is the additional value of technology X for organi-
zation W when X is implemented in common practice?’’
The last question explicitly deals with the investment
necessary to embed the technology in the organization,
how this technology interferes with existing technologies
in the organization and consequently whether disecono-
mies of scale, scope, and learning occur on the short run.
However, performing a CEA does not result in an answer
to such a research question. CEAs are often performed
alongside clinical trials, meaning they share the same
methodology as clinical trials. Such trials have, in general,
experimental designs, which differ from each other in the
degree of experimental control. The higher the level of
control, the more robust the evidence supporting a causal
relationship. Such a design has a very narrow scope
focusing on a homogeneous patient population and alter-
native technologies intervening in this specific patient
population only (disregarding multipurpose use of tech-
nologies). Obviously such a design is not suitable to answer
the question of what the impact of a technology is on the
health care provider as a whole, both in the short and long
run. Presently in the Netherlands guidelines with regard to
pharmaco-economic evaluation of expensive inpatient
pharmaceuticals are being developed. These guidelines aim
at investigating common practice efficiency of a technol-
ogy. A focus on common practice necessitates parting from
experimental designs, moving towards naturalistic designs
with less control and consequently more heterogeneity in
the population. Such a development makes it possible to
consider the impact of potentially cost-effective technolo-
gies on the production process related to a more
heterogeneous group of patients and how such technologies
interfere with existing production processes and budgetary
constraints in the organization. This approach provides
information on both long- and short-run efficiency of a new
technology from the perspective of an organization or
health care provider. Based on such knowledge one can
develop implementation strategies to increase the level and
time of adoption. This information, together with CEA
information, supports decision-making on the implemen-
tation of new technologies in a more useful way.
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